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SPILLER v. STATE: DETERMINING THE
NATURE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'
RIGHTS TO THEIR PENSIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Spiller v. State,' a divided Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sit-
ting as the Law Court, held that certain legislative changes to public
employee pension benefits did not impair the employees' constitu-
tional rights because there was no clear indication that the employ-
ees had a contractual right to their pensions. These changes were
enacted as a reduction of state expenditures in reaction to Maine's
fiscal deficit. The majority found that the changes were not uncon-
stitutional and thus were permissible.2 The dissenting opinion, how-
ever, found that a contract existed between the State and the em-
ployees and that it had been breached.3
Although the Spiller decision may have settled that no "contrac-
tual rights" result from the formation of public employee pensions
in Maine, the disagreement within the Law Court clearly parallels
the deep divisions among individual states concerning the nature of
the rights that public employees have to their pensions. The United
States Supreme Court has not issued a modern standard governing
this issue.4 A review of recent state court decisions shows a variety
of approaches among the states in addressing pensioners' rights with
no consensus toward a single uniform approach. Given the wide-
spread problem of state fiscal deficits and the corresponding need to
reduce state expenditures to shrink such deficits, this issue will
surely be revisited frequently in Maine and elsewhere as public em-
ployees suffer under the multi-headed ax of fiscal restraint. The
question now becomes: do either the majority or dissenting positions
in Spiller adequately define the rights of public pensioners? If
neither does, then what approach works best for Maine?
This Note considers the background of public pensioners' rights
within the jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. It contrasts
the approaches of different states and examines the limited atten-
tion given to public employee pensions by the United States Su-
preme Court. In particular, this Note examines the alternative ap-
proaches noted by the majority and dissent in the Spiller decision.
1. 627 A.2d 513 (Me. 1993).
2. Id. at 514. The pension modifications were enacted in P.L. 1991 ch. 591, § EEE
(codified at Ma. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 851 (West Supp. 1993-1994); Ifa. Ray. STAT.
ANN. tit. 4, § 1351 (West Supp. 1993-1994); Ma. Ra. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 17001,
17851-2 (West Supp. 1993-1994).
3. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d at 517 (Wathen, C.J., dissenting).
4. John J. Dwyer, Note, 'Tit Death Do Us Part: Pennsylvania's "Contract" With
Public Employees For Pension Benefits, 59 TtmP. LQ. 553, 570-71 (1986).
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This Note rejects the contract rights approach supported in the dis-
senting opinion and describes the profound and negative conse-
quences that such an approach, giving the employees a vested right
to their expected benefits, would have on the Maine Legislature's
ability to reduce state expenditures. After weighing numerous con-
siderations, it concludes that the Law Court correctly decided in
favor of the State but did not sufficiently support its holding with a
clear rationale. This Note contends that recognizing a property right
to public pensions, which would allow due process protection prior
to changes to the pension, would have been a preferable approach
since it would allow the Maine Legislature more flexibility to make
fiscally prudent changes to the pension system while holding its ac-
tions to a more consistent standard. The property approach would
also call for less speculation as to what "rights" the pensioners have
and would therefore be less burdensome on the courts. This Note
explains the implications of a due process property right in the area
of public pensions. In conclusion, this Note recommends that the
Maine Law Court embrace the due process approach on the next
opportunity it has to revisit the increasingly contentious issue of
public pensioners' rights.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC PENSIONERS' RIGHTS
A. The Federal View of Pensioners' Rights
There is but minimal authority from the United States Supreme
Court concerning the rights public employees have to their pensions.
Pennie v. Reis,5 decided in 1889, stands for the proposition that
5. 22 P. 176, affd 132 U.S. 464 (1889). This case concerned "An Act to Enable the
Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco to Increase the Police
Force of Said City and County, and Provide for the Appointment, Regulation and
Payment thereof." Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. at 465. This act included a mandatory
local police officers' relief and pension fund in which the California legislature had
placed part of the officer's salary into a life and health insurance fund. The plan
established a $1,000 death benefit payable to one officer's estate. The state repealed
the death benefit ten days before the officer's death. James C. Pennie, the adminis-
trator of the officer's estate, demanded that C. Reis, the treasurer of the life insurance
fund, pay the money to the estate. The treasurer refused to pay, and Pennie applied
for a writ of mandate to compel the payment. The Supreme Court of California held
that the latter act repealing the pension fund was valid and denied the prayer of
Pennie and dismissed the writ.
The United States Supreme Court decided against Pennie. The majority opinion,
written by Mr. Justice Field, noted that the pension fund, since it was created by
state law, was "entirely at the disposal of the government, until, by the happening of
one of the events stated-the resignation, dismissal, or death of the officer-the right
to the specific sum promised became vested in the officer or his representative." Id. at
471. The Court found that the state impaired no absolute right of property in the
police officer and that there was no contract on the part of the state with a "disposi-
tion" to be followed as originally drafted. The officer's interest in the fund was "a
mere expectancy created by the law" and "liable to be revoked or destroyed by the
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public employee pensions are no more than expectancies subject to
legislative revocation. This is commonly referred to as the "gratuity"
approach. Despite harsh criticism of Pennie from scholars who have
labeled the decision outdated,6 the lower federal courts still support
its holding, albeit grudgingly.7
Though Pennie has not been directly challenged or even ques-
tioned in subsequent Supreme Court decisions, its "gratuity" ap-
proach to public benefits, suggesting that employees had no legal
interest in such benefits, has been challenged in several more recent
decisions. Flemming v. Nestor" endorsed the right of legislatures to
alter, amend or repeal retirement benefits, but the decision also
noted that "[i]t is hardly profitable to engage in conceptualizations
regarding 'earned rights' and 'gratuities."' ' Goldberg u. Kelly'0
hinted that "[i]t may be realistic today to regard welfare entitle-
ments as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.""' The Court seemed
same authority." Id. The officer's fund was subject to the act repealing the fund be-
cause he had died after the repeal. Id. The money in the fund "could be transferred
to other parties and applied to different purposes by the legislature." Id. at 472.
6. See, e.g., Deborah Kemp, Public Pension Plans: The Need for Federal Regu-
lation, 10 HAMLINE L. REv. 27, 35-36 (1987) (calling for Pennie v. Reis to be over-
turned); Note, Public Employee Pensions in Times of Fiscal Distress, 90 HARV. L
Rav. 992, 994 (1977) (noting that Pennie v. Reis has been "justifiably" criticized);
Rubin G. Cohn, Public Employee Retirement Plans-The Nature of the Employees'
Rights, 1968 U. ILL. L F. 32, 35 (1968) (observing that Pennie u. Reis "is logically and
analytically disquieting").
7. See, e.g., Zucker v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (claiming that court
is "constrained" to follow Pennie), aff'd on other grounds, 758 F.2d 637 (Fed. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842 (1985); Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 378 F.
Supp. 949, 958 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (describing the Pennie rule as "harsh"), afld on
other grounds, 520 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd on rehearing en bane, 528 F.2d 499
(5th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, (the judgment was vacated and the case remanded) 438
U.S. 901 (1978), aff'd on merits, 586 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Kemp, supra
note 6, at 32-33; Cohn, supra note 6, at 34.
8. 363 U.S. 603 (1960). This decision upheld an amendment to the Social Secur-
ity Act denying benefits to aliens deported for several reasons, including membership
in the Communist Party.
9. Id. at 610.
10. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). This decision held that welfare recipients whose benefits
were to be terminated were entitled to the safeguards of due process. Id. at 261-63.
11. Id. at 262 n.8. Goldberg quoted Charles A. Reich, a chief proponent of attach-
ing property rights to entitlements:
[s]ociety today is built around entitlement. ... Many of the most impor-
tant of these entitlements now flow from government. ... Such sources of
security, whether private or public, are no longer regarded as luxuries or
gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials, fully deserved, and in no
sense a form of charity.
Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues,
74 YALE L J. 1245, 1255 (1965). Reich is particularly critical of Flemming. In another
article he noted that under Flemming "[t]he public policy that justifies cutting off
benefits need not even be an important one or a wise one-so long as it is not utterly
irrational, the Court will not interfere." Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73
1994]
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to be moving away from this approach in Richardson v. Belcher,12
which noted that Goldberg "cannot be stretched to impose a consti-
tutional limitation on the power of Congress to make substantive
changes in the law of entitlement to public benefits."' 3
Several Supreme Court decisions have suggested the need for
some protection against legislative modifications that frustrate reli-
ance on a wide range of expected public benefits. 14 These decisions
seem to be motivated by the view that the Fourteenth Amendment"0
protects public employees from the government purporting to confer
a benefit and then frustrating the reasonable reliance created by
that benefit.'" There is no modern Supreme Court decision, how-
ever, which would provide guidance for the states as to the rights of
public pensioners.
B. Treatment of Public Pensions by Individual States
Pennie v. Reis helped establish the "gratuity" approach to the
rights of public employees to their pensions. This approach allowed
legislative modification or elimination of retirement benefits to be
made without regard to the employees' interest in those benefits. 1"
The Pennie view became the dominant view among the states, with
many state courts allowing state legislatures great latitude to alter
or repeal public employee pension plans.18 In recent years, the gra-
YALE L. J. 733, 769 (1964). He further compared the philosophy of the case to feudal
tenure, under which wealth is not "vested" in its holders but is instead "held condi-
tionally. . . . Just as the feudal system linked lord and vassal through a system of
mutual dependence, obligation, and loyalty, so government largess binds man to the
state." Id. at 769-70.
12. 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
13. Id. at 81.
14. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-75 (1975) (holding that students
facing suspension from public school have liberty and property interests protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972) (finding that a public university teacher with implied tenure
is entitled to a hearing to challenge grounds of termination); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 484-87 (1972) (holding that due process requires a hearing before parole is
revoked). But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1976) (finding that damage to
reputation by state invokes no "liberty" or "property" interests sufficient to invoke
the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,
347 (1976) (holding that public employee's discharge did not deprive him of property
interest protected by the Due Process Clause).
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. V and XIV.
16. See Note, Public Employee Pensions in Times of Fiscal Distress, supra note
6, at 992, 996-97.
17. See Note, Public Employee Pension Benefits-A Promissory Estoppel Ap-
proach, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 287, 287 (1984) (observing that pension benefits
have traditionally been construed as gratuities by courts and legislatures).
18. See, e.g., Bedford v. White, 106 P.2d 469, 471 (Colo. 1940) (holding that there
is no legally vested right to a pension and it is a mere gratuity and at most an expec-
tancy); Kinny v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 113 N.E.2d 59, 61 (Mass. 1953)
(claiming that public pensions are subject to change by subsequent legislative enact-
[Vol. 46:355
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tuity approach has fallen from favor in most jurisdictions that have
dealt with this issue. The modern trend is for state courts to protect
the expectations of pension plan members.' Currently, only Indiana
and Texas openly adhere to the gratuity concept.20 There are, how-
ever, other states which view retirement benefits as gratuities that
vest only when the employee is eligible to retire and can be constitu-
tionally modified by the legislature prior to that time.2" For exam-
ple, in Florida Sheriffs Association v. Department of Administra-
tion , 22 the Florida Supreme Court noted that the rights of a public
pensioner "are not such as will prevent the Legislature from repeal-
ing or amending the [pension fund] statute, merely because the of-
ficer or employee has contributed to the fund." However, the Flor-
ida court further held that as soon as "a participating member
reaches retirement status, the benefits under the terms of the act in
meat); Eddy v. Morgan, 75 N.E. 174, 178 (Ill. 1905) (holding that the right to receive
retirement pay is subordinate to the right of the legislature to abolish pension
system).
19. Terry C. Copps, Comment, Pensions: Public Employee Plans as Contractual
Obligations Granted Constitutional Protection, 20 WASHBURN LJ 169, 171 (1980)
(noting that the earliest California decision considering entry into a pension system
as a contractual obligation was O'Dea v. Cook, 169 P. 366 (Cal. 1917)). See infra note
29.
20. See Ballard v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 324 N.E.2d 813, 815
(Ind. 1975) (pensions under state compulsory contribution plan are gratuities creating
no vested rights); Cook v. Employees Retirement Sys., 514 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1974) (holding that right to benefits of a pension fund are subordinate to the
right of the legislature to diminish benefits or abolish the pension fund). But see
Board of Trustees of Public Employees' Retirement Fund v. Hill, 472 N.E.2d 204
(Ind. 1985) (holding that Indiana judges have a vested contractual right in their vol-
untary pension plan).
21. See Jones v. Cheney, 489 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Ark. 1973) (holding that plaintiff's
rights became fully vested when he fulfilled service requirements); Petras v. State Bd.
of Pension Trustees, 464 A.2d 894, 896 (DeL 1983) (asserting that no contractual right
exists until pension vests, so plaintiff, who had completed only two years of service,
had no vested right to pension); City of Louisville v. Board of Educ., 163 S.W.2d 23,
25 (Ky. 1942) (noting that in no pension system is there a vested right until the
participant has become an actual beneficiary); Patterson v. City of Baton Rouge, 309
So. 2d 306, 313 (La. 1975) (finding no vested right to retirement benefits prior to
eligibility for retirement); Rilling v. Unemployment Compensation Div. of the Em-
ployment Sec. Bureau, 151 N.W.2d 304, 309 (N.D. 1967) (holding that individual
must retire to gain vested right to trust fund for retirement benefits); Herrick v.
Lindley, 391 N.E.2d 729, 733 (Ohio 1979) (observing that retirees have a vested right
to receive retirement allowance at the time such a benefit is payable); Baker v.
Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retirement Sys., 718 P.2d 348, 350-51 (Okla. 1986)
(finding that right to retirement and pension benefits becomes absolute when such
benefits become payable); Atchison v. Retirement Bd., 343 S.W.2d 25, 34 (Mo. 1951)
(holding that pensioners' rights vest when pensions are granted); Tait v. Freeman, 57
N.W.2d 520, 522 (S.D. 1953) (noting that retirement brings into being vested right to
pension); Driggs v. Utah State Teacher's Retirement Bd., 142 P.2d 657, 664 (Utah
1943) (holding that pensioners have vested rights upon fulfilling all requirements).
22. 408 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 1981).
1994]
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effect at the time of the employee's retirement vest. '23
Many states have fully rejected the gratuity theory as outdated.2 4
Most of those states now use some form of a contract theory to en-
force the rights of public employees to their pensions; however, the
rationales for a contractual approach are not monolithic. Six states
have provisions in their state constitutions guaranteeing that an em-
ployee's right to a pension "vests" at the time of employment and
that the state legislature may not substantially alter those rights
thereafter.2 5 States that guarantee a contractual right absent a spe-
cific state constitutional provision fall into two categories. First, are
those states that follow a "strict contract" theory under which all
elements of the contract vest upon employment and are not subject
to future change without consent of the employee. This approach
has been adopted in several states. 26 In Yeazell v. Copins,2 7 the Ari-
zona Supreme Court held that the Arizona Legislature could neither
alter the provisions of membership in a pension fund nor reduce the
amount of the contributions to the fund even if the soundness of the
fund is in jeopardy.28
A second contractual approach, a "modified contract" approach, is
23. Id. at 1036 (citing Voorhees v. City of Miami, 199 So. 313, 315 (1940)).
24. See, e.g., Police Pension and Relief Bd. v. Bills, 366 P.2d 581, 583 (Colo. 1961)
(gratuity system made pensions "always subject to unilateral change of an adverse
nature"); City of Frederick v. Quinn, 371 A.2d 724, 725 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977)
(trend is toward adopting contract theory); Halpin v. Nebraska State Patrolman's
Retirement Sys., 320 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Neb. 1982) (pension not mere grant of extra
compensation); Public Employees' Retirement Bd. v. Washoe County, 615 P.2d 972,
974 (Nev. 1980) (modern view of vested right to pension is preferable); Taylor v.
Multnomah County Deputy Sheriff's Retirement Bd., 510 P.2d 339, 341 (Or. 1973)
("Oregon has joined the ranks of those rejecting the gratuity theory of pensions.").
25. The state constitutions of Alaska, Hawaii, and Michigan all have provisions
protecting those pension benefits which the employee has already accrued. ALASKA
CONsT. art. XII, § 7; HAW. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24. Their
state courts, however, have allowed for legislative modification of conditions for fu-
ture benefits. See, e.g., Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Alaska 1981);
Chun v. Employees' Retirement Sys., 607 P.2d 415, 421 (Haw. 1980); In Re Enrolled
Senate Bill 1269, 209 N.W.2d 200, 202-03 (Mich. 1973). Illinois and New York have
constitutional amendments that protect employees' rights to retirement benefits from
legislative tampering after hiring. ILL. CONsT. art. XIII, § 5; N.Y. CONsT. art. V, § 7.
Kraus v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 390 N.E.2d 1281, 1292 (II. App.
Ct. 1979) and Birnbaum v. New York State Teachers Retirement Sys., 152 N.E.2d
241, 245 (N.Y. 1958) have prevented modifications under the rationale that the
amendments fixed the rights of employees at the time they entered the system. See
also Note, supra note 4, at 573-74.
26. Yeazell v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541, 545 (Ariz. 1965) (en banc); Burks v. Board of
Trustees, 104 S.E.2d 225, 227 (Ga. 1958) (ruling that pension is contract and cannot
be modified or repealed by legislation); Association of Pa. State College and Univ.
Faculties v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 479 A.2d 962, 966 (Pa. 1984) (prohibiting
unilateral reduction of retirement benefits by state legislature).
27. 402 P.2d 541 (Ariz. 1965).
28. Id. at 546.
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followed by the California Supreme Court. Under this approach, the
state legislature can make changes to public employees' pensions
only to the extent that the resulting disadvantage to the public em-
ployees would be offset by a comparative new advantage to the re-
tirement system. Also, the change must be necessary to maintain the
system's financial integrity. 9 The California position has been
adopted by state courts in Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Nebraska, Vermont, and Washington. 0
Two states have deviated from "contract v. gratuity" analysis in
this area. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Christensen v. Minne-
apolis Municipal Employees Retirement Board1 utilized the doc-
trine of promissory estoppe 32 to determine the constitutionality of a
public pension modification.3 3 The court evaluated whether a pro-
tected interest exists by examining exactly what had been promised
by the state and to what degree the employer had reasonably relied
on that promise. Then, to determine whether the alteration was per-
mitted under the state's police power, the court applied the three-
part balancing test of Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power &
Light,34 a recent Supreme Court decision. The balancing test ques-
29. California has recognized a contractual right of an employee to his pension
since its decision in O'Dea v. Cook, 169 P. 366 (1917). Its current law is best exempli-
fied by Betts v. Board of Admin. of the Public Employees' Retirement Sys., 582 P.2d
614 (Cal. 1978). In Betts, an elected officer who had expected an adjusted monthly
retirement allowance reflecting his predecessor's salary petitioned for that allowance.
He did not receive the promised amount because of a 1974 legislative modification
which allowed only for an allowance reflecting the highest salary that he was paid
while in office. Id. at 616-17. The Supreme Court of California struck down the modi-
fication because it offered no "comparable new advantages" to the petitioner to offset
the detriment. Id. at 619.
30. See Police Pension and Relief Bd. of Denver v. Bills, 366 P.2d 581, 585 (Colo.
1961); Nash v. Boise City Fire Dep't, 663 P.2d 1105, 1108-10 (Idaho 1983); Brazelton
v. Kansas Public Employees Retirement Sys., 607 P.2d 510, 517-18 (Kan. 1980); City
of Frederick v. Quinn, 371 A.2d 724, 726-27 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Opinion of the
Justices, 303 N.E. 2d 320, 328 (Mass. 1973); Halpin v. Neb. State Patrolmen's Retire-
ment Sys., 320 N.W.2d 910, 914-16 (Neb. 1982); Burlington Fire Fighters' Ass'n v.
City of Burlington, 543 A.2d 686 (Vt. 1988); Eisenbacher v. City of Tacoma, 333 P.2d
642, 645 (Wash. 1958).
31. 331 N.W.2d 740 (Minn. 1983).
32. Promissory estoppel is "a promise which the promisor should reasonably ex-
pect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee... and [that] does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by the
enforcement of the promise." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 90 (1981).
33. MINN. STAT. § 422A.156 (1982) codified a rise to age 60 in the age that a pen-
sioner could receive retirement benefits. This adjustment adversely affected the peti-
tioner who had retired from public service at age 38 and had been collecting a pen-
sion. Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Employees Retirement Bd., 331 N.W.2d at
742.
34. 459 U.S. 400 (1983). This decision concerned Energy Reserves Group, a natu-
ral gas supplier, which brought suit seeking a determination that it had the right to
terminate two purchase contracts because of Kansas Power & Light's (hereinafter
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tions, (1) Did the modification substantially impair the expectations
of the parties? (2) If so, did the impairment serve a legitimate public
purpose? (3) If so, was the change based upon "reasonable condi-
tions" and of a character appropriate to the public purpose justify-
ing its adoption?35
Another approach, one which rejects the gratuity and promissory
estoppel approaches and all contract theories, is a due process view
set forth by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Pineman v. Oech-
slin. The Connecticut court, in examining the modification to the
State Employees Retirement Act 37 found no legislative intent to cre-
ate permanent contractual bonds and held that the legislature must
be free to make laws without the fear that each new legislative en-
actment would create new contractual rights.38 More importantly,
KPL) refusal to redetermine price. KPL counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment
that the contracts were still in effect. Id. The Supreme Court decided in favor of
KPL. It held that KPL's price controls did not substantially impair Energy Reserve
Group's contracts with the utility. Kansas has long taken an interest in regulating the
price of natural gas. Id. at 413-14. That interest has been to protect consumers from
the escalation of natural gas prices caused by deregulation. Id. at 416-17. The deci-
sion did not involve public employee pensions.
35. Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Employees Retirement Bd., 331 N.W.2d at
750-52, (citing Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light, 459 U.S. at 411-12).
In applying these principles, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that the legislative
modification failed to pass the third part of the test because the legislature's objec-
tive, correcting inequalities, could be achieved less intrusively. Id. Minnesota is not
the only state to use a balancing approach. The North Carolina Court of Appeals also
remanded for reconsideration, using the balancing test of United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977), an adjustment of disability retirement benefits in
Simpson v. North Carolina Local Gov't Employees' Retirement Sys., 363 S.E.2d 90
(N.C. App. 1987), aff'd without opinion, 372 S.E.2d 559 (N.C. 1988).
36. 488 A.2d 803 (Conn. 1985).
37. Id. at 804-06, (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-162 (West 1988)). Pineman v.
Oechslin concerned a 1975 rise in the retirement eligibility age for female public em-
ployees. Plaintiffs, employees of the State of Connecticut, brought a class action seek-
ing a declaratory judgment establishing that the amended State Employees Retire-
ment Act impaired the state's contractual obligations to the plaintiff under Article I,
§ 10 of the United States Constitution. The district court agreed and issued a perma-
nent injunction "requiring the defendants to administer the State Employees Retire-
ment Act in a manner which respects the plaintiffs' contractual rights." Pineman v.
Oechslin, 494 F. Supp. 525, 554 (D. Conn. 1980). On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the
state court to adjudicate the plaintiffs' contract claims as a matter of state law.
Pineman v. Oechslin, 637 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1981).
The plaintiffs then brought their state action in the superior court seeking, inter
alia, a judgment declaring that the Retirement Act created a contractual obligation
regarding retirement benefits. The individual plaintiffs were granted a right to main-
tain the action on behalf of similarly situated state employees. The trial court con-
cluded that, based on examination of the Retirement Act, the Connecticut Legisla-
ture never intended to create contractual rights to public pensions. Pineman v.
Oechslin, 488 A.2d at 805.
38. Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d at 809-10.
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the court noted, in dicta, that the employees might have a property
interest in their retirement funds protected from arbitrary legisla-
tion under the Due Process Clauses of the Connecticut and Federal
Constitutions. The court concluded that:
unlike the gratuity concept, the due process approach protects
public employees from legislative confiscation of the retirement
fund and arbitrary forfeiture of pension benefits. At the same time,
a due process analysis provides the necessary flexibility that the
contract approach lacks and avoids the strain on settled principles
of contract law, statutory interpretation, and contract clause juris-
prudence that the latter view entails."
The opinions in Christensen and Pineman, through different analy-
ses, question the feasibility of using contractual analysis to resolve
public pension issues.
C. Maine's Public Employee Pension Plan
The Maine State Retirement System was created in 1942 to en-
courage "qualified persons to seek public employment and to con-
tinue in public employment during their productive years."' 0 All
Maine state employees are required to contribute to Maine's retire-
ment system; employees contribute at least 6.5% of their salaries to
the pension fund.41 State employees do not qualify to receive retire-
ment benefits until they have at least ten years of creditable ser-
vice,42 and all employees are entitled to at least the return of their
contributions together with interest if their service terminates for
39. Id. at 810. The court further noted that "[a]ithough the plaintiff employees
alleged a violation of their due process rights in their complaint, this claim was not
discussed in the federal or state trial court decisions, nor was it briefed or argued by
the parties on appeal." It declined to rule whether the 1975 revisions constituted a
deprivation of plaintiffs' property interests in the retirement fund without due pro-
cess of law, and the modifications were upheld. Id. Due process is protected under
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 and CONN. CONsT. art. 1, § 7.
Following this decision, the plaintiffs returned to federal court. The district court
in Pineman v. Fallon, 662 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Con 1987), dismissed their claim. The
dismissal was affirmed in Pineman v. Fallon, 842 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1988), which found
no violation of due process and noted that Connecticut's retirement system was
"likely, unless modified, to bankrupt Connecticut." Id. at 602. Judge Oakes noted in
his opinion that this case had a "serpentine history." The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari. Pineman v. Fallon, 488 U.S. 824 (1988).
40. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 17050 (West 1989), provides:
It is the intent of the Legislature to encourage qualified persons to seek
public employment and to continue in public employment during their pro-
ductive years. It is further the intent of the Legislature to assist these per-
sons in making provision for their retirement years by establishing benefits
reasonably related to their highest earnings and years of service and by pro-
viding suitable disability and death benefits.
41. MF. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 17701, 17701-A, 17708-17712-B (West 1989 &
Supp. 1993-1994).
42. Id. § 17851.
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any reason other than death or retirement. 43 Certain benefits, in-
cluding life insurance and disability retirement benefits, are immedi-
ately vested and due regardless of length of service."
The changes enacted in 1992 consisted of excluding unused sick-
ness or vacation time from the definition of "earnable compensa-
tion," raising the minimum age at which one can retire without pen-
alty from sixty to sixty-two and increasing the penalty for
retirement before the minimum age.45 The legislature made these
modifications as a means of closing the gap between revenues taken
in and expenditures; they applied only to state employees with less
than seven years of "creditable service" as of December 1, 1991.40
Prior to Spiller, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court had not taken
a definitive position on the nature of public pensioners' rights. In
Soucy v. Board of Trustees of the Maine State Retirement Sys-
tem, 7 the Law Court was presented with the question of legislative
modifications of employee pensions but declined to decide the case
on constitutional grounds. 4s Similarly, in Huard v. Maine State Re-
43. Id. 17705(2). See also id. § 17157 (West Supp. 1993-1994) (providing that all
interest and dividends earned on the funds of the retirement system shall be credited
to the fund).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 17801 (West 1989) provides:
No amendment to this Part may cause any reduction in the amount of
benefits which would be due to a member based on creditable service, earn-
able compensation, employee contributions, pick-up contributions and the
provisions of this Part on the date immediately preceding the effective date
of the amendment.
44. Id. §§ 17904, 18051-18061 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993-1994). However,
§ 17904(2) excludes workers with related preexisting conditions from disability bene-
fits, and § 18055(2) allows for standards regarding inclusion and exclusion of employ-
ees from coverage on the basis of nature and type of employment or conditions.
45. P.L. 1991, ch. 591, § EEE (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 851 (West
Supp. 1993-1994) (concerning eligibility for retirement and guidelines for early retire-
ment); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1351 (West Supp. 1993-1994) (setting out guide-
lines for early retirement); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 17001, 17851-17852 (West
Supp. 1993-1994) (concerning changes in "earnable compensation" definition and
qualifications for and computation of benefits)).
"Earnable compensation" means "salaries and wages paid for services rendered in
an employment position," subject to several inclusions, limitations and exclusions (in
addition to the 1991 amendments). Ma REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 17001(13) (West
Supp. 1993-1994).
46. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 514 (Me. 1993). "The total savings to the State
from these and other modifications not at issue in [Spiller v. State] are estimated at
$8,850,000 for fiscal year 1991:1992 and $25,550,000 for the fiscal year 1992-1993. The
precise savings from the particular modifications at issue are not specified in the rec-
ord but constitute a substantial portion of the total savings." Id. at 515 n.4.
47. 456 A.2d 1279 (Me. 1983).
48. Id. at 1282 n.3. The court noted that it had been "urged to hold that the
pension benefits provided for public employees is a part of the employment contract
and is constitutionally protected from impairment." However, it stated that "[w]e
have no occasion in this case to consider adoption of the Betts [v. Bd. of Administra-
tion of the Public Employees' Retirement System, 582 P.2d 614 (Cal. 1978)] ration-
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tirement System 9 the Law Court avoided the same constitutional
issue. These cases left the issue entirely open to the Spiller court.
DI. THE SPILLER DECISION
In Spiller v. State, a certified class of employees 0 of the State of
Maine and their union, the Maine State Employees Association,
sought a declaratory judgment from the Kennebec County Superior
Court that the 1992 legislative modifications of their pension bene-
fits violated the Contract Clauses of the Maine and United States
Constitutions.51 All of these employees were members of the Maine
State Retirement System, and none had completed seven years of
creditable service by December 1, 1991.52
With the parties stipulating to the essential facts and moving for
summary judgment, the Kennebec County Superior Court construed
the retirement statute to provide to the plaintiffs contractual rights.
Those right had been substantially impaired by the legislative modi-
fications.53 The State moved for an immediate appeal claiming that
ale." Id.
49. 562 A.2d 694, 698 (Me. 1989).
50. Judges, legislators, and teachers were not included in the certified class of
plaintiffs. However, their pension benefits were also modified by the Maine Legisla-
ture. Id. at 514 n.2.
Membership is mandatory for teachers; they are defined as state employees for pur-
poses of the retirement system. Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 17001(14), 17651 (West
1989). Judges are required to be members of a separate Maine Judicial Retirement
System, Ma Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1301 (West 1989). Legislators are required to be
members of the separate Maine Legislative Retirement System M. Ray, STAT. AN.
tit. 3, § 801 (West Supp. 1993-1994).
51. Ma CONST. art. I, § 11; US. CONsT, art. I, § 10.
52. Under M._ REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 851 (West Supp. 1993-1994), the modifica-
tions applied only to state employees with less than seven years of creditable service
as of December 1, 1991. Spiller v. State did not address the rights of state employees
who had qualified for retirement benefits.
53. Spiller v. State, No. CV-92-56 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., Apr. 20, 1993)
(Chandler, J.). The superior court held that, though the pensioners' rights do not
"functionally vest" (i.e., the employee cannot collect benefits) until the set times of
ten years of service or the age of 60 are met, the contractual rights of the employees
to earn a pension according to the terms promised at employment will "legally vest"
at the beginning of employment when the promises were made. Id. at 14. By following
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983), the
superior court determined that the impairment of the plaintiffs' contracts was not
constitutionally permissible. It found that the modifications at issue failed the En-
ergy Reserves three-part test and held that the contractual right to earn pension ben-
efits in accordance with the state's promised formula accrues upon acceptance of em-
ployment and thus, since the plaintiffs "legitimately and reasonably" relied on the
original pension promises, the impairment of the contractual relation was substantial.
Id. at 10-16. Although the superior court held that reducing the state deficit ,as a
significant and legitimate public purpose, it also held that other deficit-reducing al-
ternatives, including a fifteen percent income tax surcharge and across the board ap-
propriations cuts, were viable options that would not have impaired contractual
rights, and thus in light of those alternatives the pension modifications were not "rea-
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the superior court's decision could cause a "hole" of more than $5.5
million in the 1992-93 budget that would expand to $7.5 million in
the 1994-95 budget."'
On appeal, the State rejected the gratuity approach 5 and con-
tended that the Law Court should use the "balancing" test of En-
ergy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co.5 rather
than a traditional contractual approach to determine the pensioners'
rights. Relying on the Energy Reserves test, the State argued that
the impairment of the "contracts" was not substantial since the
plaintiffs, who had fewer than seven years of creditable service, did
not have a "vested" contractual right. The state argued further that
the legislature did not clearly intend to bind itself contractually to
the plaintiffs.5 7 In addition, the State argued that its interest in al-
tering the contracts was to keep the pension system fiscally sound
during a period of budget crisis5" and that the changes were reasona-
ble, particularly in light of the remaining benefit package5 s
In response, the plaintiffs largely reiterated the arguments at the
core of the superior court's rationale. They claimed that the superior
court's decision was not extreme but instead recognized a contrac-
tual relationship between themselves and the state while allowing
alterations and the breaking of obligations "consistent with the rea-
sonable expectations of the employees . . . when necessary to serve
an important public purpose." 60 The plaintiffs also cited statistics
sonable and necessary." Id. at 16-18.
54. Brief for Appellants at 9, Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513 (Me. 1993) (No. KEN-
93-191).
55. Id. at 13. Quoting Note, Public Employee Pensions in Times of Fiscal Dis-
tress, supra note 6 at 984, appellants stated that the gratuity approach "fails to rec-
ognize any protected interest in an employee's legitimate reliance on his pension." Id.
56. Id. at 13-15 (citing the three-part test of Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan-
sas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. at 411-13).
57. Id. at 17-19. The State cited National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465-66 (1985) (holding that there is a
presumption that statutes are not intended to create contractual rights but instead to
merely establish policies and programs alterable in the future).
58. Id. The State noted that, as of June 30, 1992, the Maine State Retirement
System had been threatened by an unfunded accrued benefit liability in excess of $1
billion caused in part by changes in benefits for System members without adequate
funding; the liability was expected to grow as well. Id. at 22 n.16.
59. Id. at 26-27. In addition, the state argued that the accrual rate of two percent
per year used to calculate retirement benefits was more generous than what most
other state systems offered, and that Maine also provided for post-retirement cost-of-
living adjustments, group life insurance, and health insurance. Id. at 26 n.20.
60. Brief for Appellees at 6, Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513 (Me. 1993) (No. KEN-
93-191). The Brief for Appellees discussed in this Note was submitted by Carol
Golubock, who represented the Service Employees International Union, and John Le.
mieux, general counsel for the Maine State Employees Association. An amicus curiae




showing how great the financial costs to the plaintiffs would be as a
result of the modifications.61
A majority of the Law Court decided in favor of the State. The
majority opinion held that "a statute will not be presumed to create
contractual rights ... unless the intent to do so is clearly stated.""2
The court found that the retirement statute did not give a clear in-
dication of such intent but instead stated policy principles un-
changed by the modifications.8 Furthermore, the court held that
"[b]y implication, the language reserves to future legislatures the
power to modify prospective service retirement benefits for employ-
ees to whom benefits are not then due."" None of the benefits were
due to the employees bringing suit on the date before the statute's
enactment.65
The Law Court reviewed the jurisdictions that have permitted a
contractual analysis but found no consensus on when such rights
arise and remained unpersuaded by contract theory. It expressed
concern that the implication of finding a violation of contractual
rights would not only prevent the legislature from amending its re-
tirement plan but also "would unduly restrict the power of the legis-
lature."66 The court deemed the "gratuity" approach inadequate
and noted that the "legitimate retirement expectations" of the em-
ployees might be protected either by the Due Process Clause, with
employees' expectations constituting a property right, or by promis-
61. Id. at 1-3. The appellees argued that an employee thirty years old, with five
years of service as of June 30, 1991, earning an "average State salary," faced a benefit
loss of $14,458 per year of retirement while a similar employee with two years of
employment faced an annual loss of $14,229. Also, by eliminating sick and vacation
leave from the calculation, an employee could have retirement benefits reduced by
more than $1,000 a year. The state disputed these figures and argued that they would
only hold if the average salary increased by about 7% per year from 1991 to 2011, a
"highly questionable assumption." Brief for Appellants at 7 n.5.
62. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d at 515.
63. Id. at 516 (citing ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 17050-17051, 17801 (West
1989)). See supra notes 40 and 43 for texts of ha Rav. STAT. ANN. tit 5, §§ 17050,
17081 (West 1989). Section 17051 provides:
No law outside of this Part which provides wholly or in part at the ex-
pense of the State or of any subdivision of the State for retirement benefits
for employees, or for the surviving spouses or other beneficiaries of those
employees, may apply to members or beneficiaries of the retirement system
or to the surviving spouses or other beneficiaries of those members or bene-
ficiaries. A member may not receive service credit toward a benefit under
this Part and under another system supported wholly or in part by the
State for the same service.
Id. § 17051.
64. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d at 516.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 517 (citing Pineman v. Fallon, 662 F. Supp. 1311, 1318 (D. Conn. 1987),
aff'd 842 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988)).
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sory estoppel.6 7 Ultimately, the court found no constitutional viola-
tion and upheld the modifications.
The dissent rejected the notion that the plaintiffs had no contrac-
tual rights to their promised benefits. The two dissenters 8 reasoned
that an explicit statutory statement of intent to form a contract was
not necessary to establish a contractual right09 While conceding the
ambiguity of the statute, they concluded that the state's pension
plan was intended "to attract and retain qualified employees" in ad-
dition to providing for retirement.70 According to the dissent, the
plaintiffs had acquired contractual rights by providing their services
and deferred compensation. In addition, the state's ability to pay
deferred compensation was assured by the employees' contributions
and the state's obligation to contribute annually to the pension
fund.7 1 The dissenters also used the Energy Reserves test but found
substantial impairment could exist without "total destruction" of
contractual rights." The state's modifications, according to the dis-
senters, were subject to "special scrutiny" to show that the changes
were "reasonable and necessary" since the state was modifying its
own contractual relationship.73 Under such scrutiny, the State failed
to show that the changes were "necessary" because, under the Con-
tract Clause of the United States Constitution, "the choice to impair
contractual rights is not an equal choice among other policy alterna-
tives.17 4 The dissent, however, did not address the "reasonableness"
of the modifications, claiming that "the State has failed to demon-
strate that the impairment of its contractual relationship with plain-
tiffs was necessary. ' '1 5
67. Id. The court cites Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 810 (Conn. 1985);
Fumarolo v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1307 (Ill. 1990); Spina v. Consoli-
dated Police & Fireman's Pension Fund Comm'n, 197 A.2d 169, 175 (N.J. 1964) as
supporting protection of "reasonable retirement expectations" by recognizing them as
property rights requiring due process prior to being deprived by the legislature, and
Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Employees Retirement Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740, 748
(Minn. 1983) as authority for using a promissory estoppel approach toward changing
certain retirement benefit provisions.
68. Chief Justice Wathen and Justice Glassman wrote the dissent.
69. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d at 518 (Wathen, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 518-19.
71. Id. at 520 (citing Betts v. Board of Admin. of Pub. Employee Retirement Sys.,
582 P.2d 614, 617 (Cal. 1978)).
72. Id. (citing Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. at
411).
73. Id. at 521.
74. Id. (citing United Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. at 26 (hold-
ing that the Contract Clause would provide no protection if the State could reduce its




IV. DETERMINING PUBLIC PENsIoNERs' RIGHTS IN MAI
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions in Spiller ade-
quately addressed public pensioners' rights. The primary shortcom-
ing of the majority opinion is that it failed to explain fully its
pragmatic notion that, despite its holding that the legislative modifi-
cations are not unconstitutional, "state employees have legitimate
retirement expectations... [which] are more than a gratuity to be
granted or withheld arbitrarily at the whim of the sovereign state."70
The opinion made note of the estoppel" and property8 approaches
as justification for their holding but neither examined those ap-
proaches in any real detail nor conclusively defined the nature of
public pensioners' rights; instead, the Law Court merely cited the
judicial decisions endorsing those approaches.
The majority opinion was correct in rejecting the approach of the
dissent,79 which was based on the highly questionable notion that
the plaintiffs had implied contractual rights in their pensions de-
spite the lack of statutory language indicating such rights. Acknowl-
edging that the governing statute is ambiguous,80 the dissent tried
to piece together a patchwork of commentary by individual legisla-
tors showing legislative intent to create a contractual right. Their
analysis was both accurate to a degree and self-defeating, for that
legislative intent was meant to apply solely to those whose rights
had "vested" in contrast to the parties in the present case.8' Still,
76. Id. at 517. See also Note, Public Employee Pensions in Times of Fiscal Dis-
tress, 90 HARV. L. REv., at 994-95.
77. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d at 517 n.12 (citing Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun.
Employees Retirement Bd., 331 N.W.2d at 748).
78. Id. (citing Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d at 810); Fumarolo v. Chicago Bd. of
Educ., 566 N.E.2d at 1307; Spina v. Consolidated Police & Fireman's Pension Fund
Comm'n, 197 A.2d at 175.
79. The majority states that "'[t]he contract approach plays havoc with basic
principles of contract law, traditional contract clause analysis and, most importantly,
the fundamental legislative prerogative to reserve to itself the implicit power of statu-
tory amendment and modification."' Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d at 517 n.11 (quoting
Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d at 808). See also Fumarolo v. Chicago Bd. of Educ.,
566 N.E.2d at 1306; Note, Public Employee Pensions in Times of Fiscal Distress,
supra note 6 at 1002. Also, the majority opinion quotes language from National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. at 465-66 (holding
that a statute will not be presumed to create contractual rights which bind future
legislatures unless the intent to do so is clearly stated). Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d at
515.
80. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d at 519 (citing M& REv. STAT. ANm tit. 5, § 17801
(1989)).
81. Id. at 518-19. The dissenting opinion cited a number of statements by mem-
bers of the Maine Legislature to prove its point that the plaintiffs have a contractual
right to their pensions. These statements do not prove that point. An example is
Senator Collins's statement that "[t]hose people already in the system, in effect, have
a lifetime contract as to the nature of their retirement system. They stay with what
we have on the books." Id. at 4 (citing Legis Rec. 590 (1984)). Senator Collins's state-
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the dissent cited the California case of Betts v. Board of Adminis-
tration of Public Employee Retirement System82 as authority for
the modified contract approach and found that the choice to impair
contractual rights is not an equal choice among other policy alterna-
tives. Furthermore, the dissent urged that the impairment of con-
tracts must be "necessary" and "reasonable" to be constitutional. "
According to the dissent, for a change to be "necessary," it must
be the case that a less drastic modification or alternative would not
have achieved the public purpose.8 4 This definition raises the ques-
tion of whether the Law Court is the proper judge of such necessity.
The issue of whether retirement benefit modifications are more or
less "drastic" than alternatives in light of the troubled pension fund
(e.g., raising taxes on the whole state, eliminating retirement bene-
fits for future employees, large cuts in other appropriations) is not
specifically answered by the Law Court. The substantive decision on
this matter is better provided by the Maine Legislature, which has
the "power of the purse." The court should give appropriate defer-
ence to the legislature and subject their modifications only to an
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review.
The dissent also failed to address "reasonableness," defined as the
appropriateness of changes in light of the circumstances and the de-
gree to which the problem could have been anticipated. 85 While the
dissenting opinion indicated that other jurisdictions have found sim-
ilar modifications to be "substantial impairment," 8 the dissenters
gave no consideration to the severity (or lack thereof) of the pension
changes and claimed that they "need not assess the reasonableness
of the modifications because in our judgment the State has failed to
demonstrate that the impairment of its contractual relationship
with plaintiffs was necessary."" Under the dissenters' approach, the
Maine Legislature would not be given a clear indication of whether
its modifications were reasonable and whether similar future modifi-
cations might be reasonable.
ment may well be correct, but it applies only to those employed by the State of
Maine by or before 1984, none of whom are parties to this action.
82. 582 P.2d 614 (Cal. 1978).
83. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d at 521.
84. Id. (citing United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1977)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 520 (citing Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Employees Retirement
Bd., 331 N.W. 740, 751 (Minn. 1983) (increasing the minimum age at which retire-
ment benefits may be paid is substantial impairment)); Opinion of the Justices, 609
A.2d 1204, 1210 (N.H. 1992) (requiring state employees to take unpaid leave is sub-
stantial impairment); Association of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters v.
State of New York, 940 F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 1991) (deferring employees' pay is
substantial impairment); Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467, 476 (Kan. 1980)
(doubling employee contributions to a pension plan without an increase in benefits is
substantial impairment).
87. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d at 521 (Wathen, C.J. dissenting).
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Had the majority opinion embraced the dissent's contract analy-
sis, it would have prevented the Maine Legislature from modifying
the pensions as it did. More significantly, it would probably also
send the message that any statutory promises made to any group
that was dependent financially on the state government could not be
modified so long as there was some semblance of legislative intent
that such promises were contractual. The Maine Legislature cannot
afford to have this analytical albatross around its neck at a time
when the state is fiscally plagued by both recession and a budget
deficit and must make difficult and unpopular choices to stabilize
the Maine economy.
The shortcomings of contractual analysis applied to public em-
ployee benefits are widely recognized. Numerous commentators have
lambasted the "strict contract" approach as too restrictive," but
California's "modified contract" approach has great flaws of its own.
California's approach may adequately protect the legitimate expec-
tation interest of the public employee while allowing the legislature
to make changes in the system.8 9 It may, however, prevent state leg-
islatures from making changes that in the long run would signifi-
cantly strengthen the pension fund, especially if every time one ben-
efit is diminished another must be increased. The modified contract
approach forces the court to decide issues that may be best left to
the expertise of actuaries. 90
The majority opinion was sparse in its discussion of both the es-
toppel and property approaches. It would have been useful to have
examined these approaches in much greater detail to show their im-
plications. There are strong arguments in support of rejecting the
estoppel analysis. The major strength of the estoppel approach is its
flexibility; it allows the state to modify pension plans when fiscal
interests are crucially at stake while recognizing that public pensions
were used as an enticement for attracting and retaining qualified
employees who might otherwise work in higher-paying private sector
88. See, e.g., Rubin G. Cohn, Public Employee Retirement Plans-The Nature of
the Employees' Rights, 1968 U. ILL L.F. 32, 42-46 (1968) (observing that cases en-
dorsing this theory "exalt labels over substance, and in the process create or perpetu-
ate dubious law."); Note, Public Employee Pensions in Times of Fiscal Distress,
supra note 6, at 998-1000 (finding that the contract approach does not adequately
accommodate reliance interests of employees with the fiscal health of the states);
John J. Dwyer, Note, 'Til Death Do Us Part: Pennsylvania's "Contract" With Public
Employees for Pension Benefits, 59 Tssp. L Q. 553, 578-80 (1986) (strict contract
approach precludes legislature from making even necessary modifications to pension
plans).
89. See Copps, supra note 19, at 177.
90. See Dwyer, supra note 4, at 584. See also Maryland State Teachers Ass'n v.
Hughes, 594 F. Supp. 1353, 1371 (D. Md. 1984) (holding that courts lack the re-
sources to second guess legislatures on what is necessary to ensure the financial sta-
bility of pension. funds).
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jobs.9 1 Promissory estoppel, however, also injects considerable un-
certainty into public pension law. If public employees were able to
prevent modifications to their pensions based on "reasonable reli-
ance," then a case could be brought against the state for any modifi-
cation adversely affecting a state employee, and the subjective stan-
dards would require a case-by-case analysis for virtually every
individual claiming reliance.92 Another problem with case-by-case
analysis is the likelihood of inconsistency between cases and the
ability of the legislature to foresee, and prescribe methods for deal-
ing with, the variety of actions inducing "reasonable reliance." The
subsequent result of the estoppel approach might well be a flood of
litigation so great that it would discourage any kind of modification
of the pension system. As a result, the estoppel approach might ac-
tually prove to restrict the legislature as much as the "strict con-
tract" approach.
Instead, the due process and property rights approach set forth in
Pineman v. Oechslin,93 though not widely followed in public pension
decisions," appears to set the best course for determining public
pensioners' rights. More than any other decision on this issue,
Pineman effectively drew a line in the sand between what should
and what should not be constitutionally permissible when state leg-
islatures modify public pension plans. This approach indicates that
distinction by focusing on the employees' interest in the amount
they have paid into the state retirement fund and the degree to
which that interest is entitled to protection from arbitrary legisla-
tive action. For example, the amount in the fund would be protected
from legislative confiscation and arbitrary forfeiture. 95 The dissent-
ers in Spiller claim that this approach affords little protection from
a significant reduction in benefits.96 What employees have put into
the fund would, however, be protected under the property approach.
What money goes into the fund in the future and how the money
already in the fund is administered may be subject to change if a
property right is recognized.
The Pineman approach is preferred by at least one commentator,
who noted that it would relieve the courts of determining whether
one disadvantage would be offset by a new advantage, as in the Cali-
91. See Note, supra note 17, at 294 (arguing that Minnesota's approach is entice-
ment for employees who otherwise might not choose to enter the public sector).
92. See id. See also Dwyer, supra note 4, at 586 (arguing that expectations fos-
tered by government promises are historically unenforceable through estoppel).
93. 488 A.2d 803 (Conn. 1985).
94. Though no other state has followed Pineman, New Jersey has recognized a
property right for public pensioners. See Spina v. Consolidated Police & Fireman's
Pension Fund Comm'n, 197 A.2d at 175 (public employee has property interest in
existing fund which state cannot simply confiscate).
95. Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d at 810.
96. See Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d at 519.
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fornia view, or whether some different alteration or budget cutback
would have been less burdensome on the employee (as the Spiller
dissent proposes).97 Another commentator noted that the property
approach "gives hope that legislative and judicial collaboration can
produce constructive and realistic principles which are appropriately
responsive to the legitimate need of both employee and govern-
ment."9 Even one critic of this property approach concedes that it
addresses "what the government can do with the existing fund
rather than. . . how the government can modify the employee's ex-
pected benefit."9
Thus, the critical difference between the Pineman approach and
the Christensen estoppel approach is that the former protects the
amounts that public employees have already paid into a retirement
fund, while the latter protects, somewhat generally, their "expected
benefits" which include more than that which is already in the fund.
The differences in clarity and scope between these two approaches
make it particularly frustrating that the Law Court recognized both
as rationales for its holding in Spiller. The court failed to acknowl-
edge that the two approaches call for very different analyses and
produce very different results.
One significant problem remains with the Pineman approach. In
both Pineman and Spiller, the changes to the pension system were
fairly moderate and not such as would cause a major disruption for
the affected employees. But, Pineman does not explain whether the
property approach would be appropriate if legislative changes to the
pension system included, for instance, a raise in the retirement age
to eighty or the payment of the pension over one hundred years. In
these rather extreme instances, the Pineman analysis seems inap-
propriate. Such examples call for an "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard of review. Changes that applied to state employees who had
more than seven years of employment at the time the changes were
made might also require such a standard. In the case of those
changes, there might also be questions of breach of contract since
that seven-year time period was mentioned in the retirement plan;
that issue was not raised in Spiller because none of the plaintiffs
had seven years of creditable service. For non-vested employees,
however, changes found not to be arbitrary and capricious should
have their constitutionality determined under the Pineman
standard.
Were the Law Court to base its decision upon the Pineman prop-
erty rights approach, the court would almost certainly still hold that
the modifications did not violate constitutional rights of the pen-
97. See supra note 4, at 586.
98. Cohn, supra note 6, at 50.




sioners. Although the question of the effect on the employees' ex-
pected benefits might remain unsettled, the court would most likely
find the changes in the definition of "earnable income" to be consti-
tutional because they affected not what was in the pension fund al-
ready but instead what portions. of the plaintiffs' income could go
into the fund in the future. Also, while Pineman does not create a
set standard for permissible changes in early retirement age require-
ments, the fact that it sustained Connecticut's decision to raise the
early retirement age by five years indicates that Maine's raise in its
retirement age by two years would likely be sustained if Pineman
was followed. The critical difference with the Pineman view is that
the Law Court would have a workable standard for future public
pension issues: that legislative modifications must not deprive the
pensioners of the interests they have in the existing fund.
One can be sure that the issue of public pensioners' rights will
arise again in the near future. Even in the wake of Spiller, the
Maine retirement system continues to come under fire as a fiscal
cyclone spinning out of control. A recent study conducted by the
Maine State Retirement System shows that the system is un-
derfunded by $1.25 billion.100 That leaves the State of Maine with a
Hobson's choice of either slashing benefits or raising taxes to pay for
the system.10 1 This debate will almost certainly continue out of ne-
cessity, and those who stand to lose as a result of modifications can
be expected to seek legal redress.
With scant hindsight, it is difficult to know what economic and
social costs these modifications will have for Maine's public employ-
ees. Quite possibly these costs will be of the proportions suggested
by the pensioners in their Law Court brief.1 2 The issue of whether
modifications that are constitutional under Pineman cause more ec-
onomic hardship than leaving the system unmodified should be open
for vigorous debate. However, that debate should occur in the Maine
Legislature. The Law Court should refrain from acting on economic
policy which presents no constitutional violation. As Justice Black
noted in his dissent in Goldberg v. Kelly,'0 3 "[h]ad the drafters of
the Due Process Clause meant to leave judges such ambulatory
power to declare laws unconstitutional, the chief value of a written
constitution, as the Founders saw it, would have been lost.'
10 4
100. This study was commissioned by Robert A.G. Monks, who led a similar study
in 1987. The study's recommendations will be presented to the Legislature this year.
101. See Nancy Perry, Pension System Needs Big Change, Study Says, ME. SUN-
DAY TELEGRAM, Oct. 31, 1993, at 1A.
102. See supra, note 61.
103. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
104. Id. at 276-77 (Black, J., dissenting).
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V. CONCLUSION
Spiller v. State comes at a crucial time as Maine's legislature
comes to grips with the tough choices needed to close its gap be-
tween expenditures and revenues. Spiller may have been correctly
decided, but its holding does not present a specific course on which
the legislature may steer the issue of public pensioners' rights in the
future. The dissenters' views would present even greater policy
problems. The best approach for the Law Court to take in the fu-
ture, whenever they must revisit the issue of the pension rights of
public employees, is to continue to reject the contract approach of
the dissenters but also more fully embrace the property rights ap-
proach of Pineman v. Oeschslin. Using this approach, the Law
Court would not base its decision on some tenuous relationship that
may or may not exist between the state and its employees but in-
stead would look at whether public employees' actual interests in
the pension fund are protected.
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